The security risks of
China’s abnormal demographics
·BY ANDREA
DEN BOER AND VALERIE M. HUDSON
At the Third Plenum held
in November 2013, the Chinese Communist Party announced the establishment of a new National Security Commission
designed to increase state security and social stability and provide greater
coordination between internal and external security. This
linkage between internal and external security is one that security scholars
and policymakers have not sufficiently recognized. While external issues such
as relations with Japan, Taiwan and North Korea, and concerns related to
China’s military power and nuclear weapons, are of major concern to those
seeking peaceful relations with China, we argue that the security
risks posed by China’s abnormal demographics must be taken into account when
assessing China’s security.
Fertility
patterns, high birth-sex ratios and the resulting gender imbalance, when
coupled with inequalities between rural and urban workers, have contributed to
increases in societal instability characterized by a rise in violent crime, the
numbers of secret societies and gangs, the levels of muscular nationalism, and
prostitution and trafficking in women and children. These national
effects, in turn, can have regional and international repercussions as they
undermine national stability and security.
According
to China’s 2010 Census,
men currently outnumber women by at least 34 million, an
imbalance in large part due to China’s fertility policy (known as the one child
policy) and a preference for sons. Despite government attempts
to stop the use of sex-selective technologies to manipulate the sex of
offspring, birth-sex ratios remain high (118-120 male babies
for every 100 female babies born in 2010). The dearth of women
among the young adult population is of particular concern to demographers,
who estimate that the sex ratio of the marriageable population will continue to
rise and will peak between 2030 and 2045, with the effect that at least 20 percent of men will be unable to marry.
A
surplus of 40-50 million bachelors throughout the mid- to late 21st century
will have a significant effect on China’s stability and development as a nation: Male criminal behavior drops significantly upon marriage, and the presence of significant numbers of unmarriageable men
is potentially destabilizing to societies. In the case of China,
the fact that a sizeable percentage of young adult males will not be making
that transition will have negative social repercussions, including increased
crime, violent crime, crimes against women, vice, substance abuse and the
formation of gangs that are involved in all of these antisocial behaviors.
The high concentrations of involuntary bachelors, or bare
branches, in China’s poorer provinces (there are already a significant number
of “bachelor villages”) may also be exacerbated by the presence
of ethnic minorities in these areas, where the gender
imbalance may contribute to social tensions. Those who leave the
unproductive rural areas to seek employment in urban areas are faced with
problems created by China’shukou (household registration) system,
which denies access to economic and social benefits to illegal migrants in China’s “floating population.”
The
floating population is rapidly changing the landscape of China’s urban areas,
and the Chinese government is aware of both the benefits and risks posed by
internal migrants. The current floating population is
young — 62 percent are under 35 and the majority of them have a
junior high school level of education or less, and are only slightly more male
(53 percent), although the sex
composition of the floating population varies by geographic area and by
employment sector. In Guangdong province alone, the male migrant
population outnumbers the female population by 3.1 million. The gender
imbalance of migrants in these areas may mean that these areas are at risk for higher levels of crime and greater
social instability.
An
estimated 10 percent to 30 percent of the floating
population participates in criminal secret societies known as black societies (heishehui),
groups believed to account for the majority of criminal activity in China, or
in “dark forces” (e’shili), the more loosely organized criminal gangs.
At the moment, China views the rise
in gangs and increased crime rates as local, not national, problems,
although many gangs are operating both nationally and internationally, and
often with the collaboration of local government officials, as demonstrated by
the 2009-2010crackdown in
Chongqing.
Compounding
the situation is the March 2014 announcement of the state’s National New-Type Urbanization Plan,
which aims to increase urbanization to 60 percent by 2020, and plans to ensure
that 45 percent of those in urban areas have official urban status.
This mandated aggregation of the population will not only deepen resentment
among many urban and rural residents, but will also provide an improved
logistical foundation for recruitment of the disaffected by groups with
grievances against the current system. The ranks of the disaffected
surely include China’s bare branches, who have been fodder for such groups
throughout Chinese history.
China’s demographic situation is
further complicated by the increase in its aging population and the decline in the labor
force. China is different from the other
aging countries of the world in that a) it is not yet fully developed, b) most
of its population is still poor, and c) it has the highest sex ratio in the
world. By 2055, China’s elderly population will exceed the elderly population
of all of North America, Europe and Japan combined, and this is exacerbated by
the now declining working-age population. China’s impressive economic growth
has been facilitated by its expanding working-age population: The population ages 15-64 increased by
55 percent between 1980 and 2005, but this age cohort is now in decline due to
the declining fertility rate. In 2012, the working age population declined by 3.5
million and is expected to continue to decline unless there is
a dramatic shift in China’s fertility rate.
Aging
will have a negative effect on economic growth through higher pension and healthcare costs, fewer low-income jobs,
increased wage depression, slowing economic growth and job creation, declining
interest from foreign investors, lower entrepreneurship, and higher budget
deficits. Labor force declines also translate into lower tax
revenues for governments, and if these governments are tempted
by deficit financing, global financial stability may be compromised, according
to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on
Global Aging.
When
we look at global aging, China’s aging, and the synergy between the likely
economic effects of aging and the effects of abnormal sex ratios in China, the
confluence is likely to be dangerous for the Chinese government. There appears to be an inevitable economic slowdown
approaching in the global economy that will last well beyond the effects of the
Great Recession of 2008, primarily due to aging trends in the most advanced
economies. This global slowdown is likely to amplify the
economic storm clouds already looming for China. A society with a masculinized
young adult population, such as China’s, is likely to respond to significant
economic hardship with heightened domestic instability and crime. As a result,
the Chinese regime may be hard pressed to maintain its usual control over
society and to meet this internal security challenge, the regime may
well become more authoritarian.
The
Chinese government realizes that they must maintain the respect of their bare
branch populations: a government perceived as weak invites the contempt of its
society’s young men who might also exploit vulnerabilities to undermine the
regime’s control over the country. Governments quickly learn they must react
swiftly and aggressively in the wake of perceived slights and insults from
other countries.
A
“virile” form of nationalism begins to creep into the government’s foreign
policy rhetoric, and it is stoked domestically to
keep the allegiance of young adult bare branches. Faced with
worsening instability at home and an unsolvable economic decline, China’s
government may well be tempted to use foreign policy to “ride the tiger” of
domestic instability. The government’s fanning of nationalist
fervor has already been seen in the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
where large and violent protests around the country were accompanied by the dramatic public destruction of Japanese
goods and strong expressed anti-Japanese sentiments.
The
recent minor relaxation of the one child policy announced
at the Third Plenum will do little to address the imbalance in China’s
population in future, but there is
hope that this is the first of further changes to reduce state control of
fertility. Even if sex ratios were rectified today, young adult sex ratios in China will result in a
significant gender imbalance in the adult population for the next 30 years.
The US
needs to be aware of the possibility of greater internal instability if China
experiences reduced economic growth, which may disproportionately affect the
bare branch population. Furthermore, the U.S. needs to consider how
China’s estimated 34-50 million bare branches figure in to the strategic
trajectory of its relations with Japan and Russia, as well as
nearby states with sizable proportions of bare branches themselves (such as
India and Vietnam). U.S. policymakers should be aware that Chinese leaders may
perceive a relatively short window of time for China to leverage its rise so as
to maximize power and achieve its perceived national interests in the regional
and international system. China’s high sex ratios are not a matter of
concern for China alone; as former secretary of state Hillary Clinton noted,
“the subjugation of women is a direct threat to the security of the United
States,” and in this case, she is certainly correct.
Valerie M. Hudson is
professor and George H.W. Bush chair in the Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M University.
Andrea den Boer is
a senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent in the
United Kingdom.
This
is the third in a series of posts from a conference “Beyond the Pivot: Managing
Asian Security Crises,” held in the Senate Hart Building on April 30, 2014, 11
a.m.-3 p.m. For more information, visit cpost.uchicago.edu.
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